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1 & Rovira, 2007 for an overview of regulatory interventions in the European Union). In general, pharmaceutical regulation follows two approaches: On the supply side, regulatory instruments such as price caps or maximum wholesale margins are intended to restrict monopoly pricing and reduce prices of covered products and services. On the demand side, instruments like reference prices or copayments aim at increasing price sensitivity and reducing reimbursement by the insurer. A commonly applied supply side instrument is external reference pricing, where the price cap for a drug is based on prices for the same product in other countries (Espin & Rovira, 2007) . All European Union member states except the United Kingdom and Sweden apply external reference pric- External reference pricing makes pricing decisions for di¤erent countries interdependent and may result in a (downward) price convergence (Toumi et al., 2013). Stargardt & Schreyögg (2006) analyze the impact of a price change in Germany on pharmaceutical prices in other countries under external reference pricing. They …nd that, if the respective drug is sold in all referenced countries, a 1 Euro-price reduction in Germany will reduce maximum reimbursement prices from e0.15 in Austria to e0.36 in Italy, with the method applied to calculate the external reference price determining the impact. Price spillovers may induce …rms to delay or even limit supply to low-price countries in order to (temporarily) retain high prices in other countries (Richter, 2008 pharmaceutical …rms when launching a drug under external reference pricing. They …nd no incentive to delay the launch, when the countries only refer to the prices of a subset of all countries in a transitive way and in any period. Persson & Jönsson (2015) argue that applying external reference pricing is attractive, but costly, as it induces manufacturers to limit or delay launches and reduces the opportunities for price discrimination among countries.
Garcia Mariñoso, Jelovac & Olivella (2011) and Ackermann (2010) analyze the incentives for countries to adopt external reference pricing. Using a two-country framework, where the home country can either negotiate prices independently or adopt external reference pricing, while the foreign country negotiates the drug price with a pharmaceutical …rm, Garcia Mariñoso, Jelovac & Olivella (2011) …nd that the home country prefers external reference pricing if copayments are relatively high. Using a two-country framework where countries di¤er in market size, Ackermann (2010) shows that a country prefers external reference pricing if its regulatory agency has considerably less bargaining power compared to the other country.
Against this background, this paper models di¤erent external reference pricing schemes -a price cap based on the drug price in one or two countries and on the minimum or average drug price-in a three-country framework. It studies the choice of external reference pricing schemes in one country as well as its e¤ect on welfare in the other countries, the manufacturer's export decision, and the incentives for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme. Depending on market size in the country adopting external reference pricing and market size di¤erence of the other two countries, welfare is highest under the minimum price-rule or under the average price-rule. External reference pricing increases the drug price and decreases welfare in the other countries. If the market size in the country adopting an external reference pricing scheme is su¢ciently large, the manufacturer does not export to the other countries. There is the incentive for the other countries also adopt an external reference pricing scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is presented. Section 3 studies the regulatory scenarios. Section 4 analyzes the choice of regulatory schemes in one country, section 5 studies its e¤ect on welfare in the other countries. Section 6 analyzes the choice of external reference pricing schemes on the manufacturer's export decision. Section 7 studies incentives for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme. Section 8 concludes. 3 
The Model
Consider an innovative …rm selling a drug in three countries, j = A; B; C. The …rm is located in a fourth country.
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the drug. The utility derived from no drug consumption is zero. A consumer i in country j who buys one unit of drug obtains a net utility of
where ij is a preference parameter and c j country-speci…c drug copayment. Assume that the parameter is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; j ] in country j = A; B; C, where A , B c = 1: This is, countries di¤er in size. The parameter can be interpreted as willingness to pay, for instance due to di¤erences in the severity of the condition, prescription practices or insurance coverage (see e.g. Brekke, Holmas & Straume, 2011) or it can be interpreted as income. In country j, health insurance reimburses a fraction of the drug price, the remaining fraction j is paid by the patient. This is, the drug copayment is c j = j p j .
Assume the following timing: In stage 1, the government in country A chooses the design of the external reference pricing scheme to maximize welfare. In stage 2, the …rm sets prices.
Regulatory Scenarios

Free Price Setting
Consider …rst the case without regulation, when the manufacturer can set countryspeci…c prices. The manufacturer sets country-speci…c prices p j to maximize its pro…t
The equilibrium price p j in country j is
The manufacturer's pro…t from selling in country j is 
External Reference Pricing
Consider now the case that country A adopts external reference pricing.
One Reference Country
Consider …rst that country A sets a price cap based on the price in one country. Two cases are possible, the price cap can be based on the drug price in country B or on the drug price in country C. The choice between the two reference countries is considered exogenous at this point.
If the price cap is based on the price in country B, the manufacturer sets the price ;
The equilibrium prices are
; p
The manufacturer's pro…t is
If the price cap is based on the price in country C, the manufacturer sets the price 
Two Reference Countries, Minimum Price
Consider now that country A sets a price cap based on the minimum price in countries B and C.
, the price in country B is lower than in country C and the price cap is based on the drug price in country B.
, the price in country C is lower than in country B and the price cap is based on the drug price in country C.
If B < c B and the price cap is based on the price in country B, the manufacturer sets the price p min B with p min B = p min A to maximize its joint pro…t from countries A and B and the price p min C to maximize the pro…t from country C min
, the price ranking is intransitive: If the price cap is based on the drug price in country B, i.e. the price in B is the "minimum price", the drug price in country C is lower, but if the price cap is based on the drug price in country C, the drug price in country B is lower. Moreover, the resulting price is higher, if the price cap is based on the drug price in country C. Two assumptions for this intransitive price ranking are possible: i) The price cap is based on the drug price in country B. This is a reasonable outcome, if the government aims at the lowest price and accepts the violation of the minimum price-rule, if it anticipates this intransitive price ranking or if the minimum price-rule is based on ex-ante prices, i.e.
prices before external reference pricing is implemented. ii) The price cap is based on the drug price in country C. This outcome can be expected if the government learns that the price in country C is lower, switches to basing the price cap on the price in country C, but does not switch back, either because it does not further observe prices in the market or because it learns about the intransitive price ranking. If there are multiple switches, either of these outcomes is possible. In what follows, both outcomes will be considered.
If B > c B and the price cap is based on the price in country C, the manufacturer sets the price p min C with p min C = p min A to maximize its joint pro…t from countries A and C and the price p min B to maximize the pro…t from country B min
an intransitive price ranking occurs. If the price cap is based on the drug price in country C, i.e. the price in C is the "minimum price", the drug price in country B is lower, but if the price cap is based on the drug price in country B, the drug price in country C is lower. Similarly, two outcomes -price cap is based on the price in country C and the price cap is based on the price in country B -are reasonable and will be considered both in the following analysis.
Two Reference Countries, Average Price
Consider now that country A sets a price cap based on the average price in countries 
Choice of Regulatory Schemes
Consider now the choice of the external reference pricing schemes, i.e. the choice of reference countries and pricing rules in a three-country framework. The government in country A chooses the regulatory scheme to maximize local welfare.
Welfare is given as
Local pro…ts of the manufacturer are considered because it may result in tax revenues for the government and/or in jobs in country A. The same results would be obtained if pro…ts were not considered at all. 6 Welfare decreases in the price, so maximizing welfare is equivalent to minimizing the drug price.
If the government wants to minimize the drug price, referring to the drug price of one country only (either B or C) is not optimal, as it yields the same price as referring to the minimum price in countries B and C or yields a higher price. This is, in what follows the choice between free price setting, referring to two countries with a minimum price-rule, and referring to two countries with an average price-rule will be studied.
External reference pricing results in a lower drug price and higher welfare, if the market size in country A relative to the coinsurance rate is su¢ciently large. 7 For the choice between the external reference pricing schemes consider four cases. 6 Then welfare is given as WA = CSA EA = Welfare in country B is given as
As welfare decreases in the price, lower drug prices increase welfare, while higher prices decrease welfare.
Under both the minimum price-rule and the average price-rule, the drug price in country B is higher than under free pricing (p min B > p B , p Proposition 2 If country A adopts the minimum price-rule or the average price-rule, welfare in country B is lower than under free pricing in country A.
Endogenous Export Decision
Consider now that the …rm may adjust its export decision to the choice of regulatory schemes in country A. In particular, it may refrain from exporting to one of the countries, if a low price may spill over to a high price country. The e¤ect of the regulatory scheme 
Mutual Referencing
Consider now that not only country A, but all countries may adopt external reference pricing schemes. Consider symmetric regulatory scenarios, where countries adopt the same regulatory scheme.
One Reference Country
If countries set a price cap based on the price in one other country, two scenarios are possible.
where f B is the solution to 10
where f B is the solution to
i) Only one country sets a price cap based on the price in another country or two countries refer to each other. Then the manufacturer sets the same drug price in these two countries, while he can set the price in the third country freely. This case is similar to the one studied in section 3.2.1.
ii) Countries circularly refer to another country. Then the manufacturer sets the same drug price in all three countries.
In case ii), the …rm sets a uniform price p for all three countries to maximize its
The equilibrium price is
The equilibrium pro…t is
In case i), if country A refers to the price in country B (or C), there is no incentive or disincentive for country B (or C) to refer back to the price in country A, as this has no e¤ect on drug price in the respective country. But if country A refers to the price in country B, there is the incentive for country C to also refer to the price in country A or B, as it would result in a lower drug price in country C (p < p C for A < c A j
).
Two Reference Countries, Minimum Price
If countries set a price cap based on the minimum price in two other countries, three cases are possible.
i) Only one country adopts the minimum price-rule and refers to the drug prices in the two other countries. The manufacturer can set the price in the third country freely.
This case is similar to the one studied in section 3.2.2., except that it refers to a di¤erent country.
ii) Two countries adopt the minimum price-rule and prices are in these countries are lower than in the third country. The manufacturer can set the price in the third country freely. This case is similar to the one studied in section 3.2.2.
iii) All countries adopt the minimum price-rule and the manufacturer sets the same drug price in all three countries. This is the case studied in section 7.1 ii).
If country A adopts the minimum price-rule and refers to the minimum price in country B or C, there is no incentive for the country with the lower price (B or C) to also adopt the minimum price-rule, as the outcome in case i) and ii) is the same. But for the third country, say country C, if B < c B , there is the incentive to also adopt the minimum price-rule, as it would result in a lower drug price (p < p B for A < c A j
Two Reference Countries, Average Price
If countries set a price cap based on the average price in two other countries, three cases are possible.
i) Only one country adopts the average price-rule. This case is similar to the one studied in section 3.2.3.
ii) Two countries adopt the average price-rule. Then the manufacturer sets the same drug price in all three countries. This is the case studied in section 7.1 ii).
iii) All countries adopt the average price-rule and the manufacturer sets the same drug price in all three countries. This is the case studied in section 7.1 ii).
If country A adopts the average price-rule, there is the incentive to also adopt the average price rule for the "larger" country with the higher drug price, as it would result in a lower drug price (p < p
. This is, independent of which regulatory scheme country A chooses, there is the incentive for the third country or the country with the higher price to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme.
Also, independent of which regulatory scheme country A chooses in the …rst place, the outcome is the same in all cases: uniform pricing for all three countries. This also implies that independent of which external reference pricing scheme the other countries choose, uniform pricing is the outcome. The incentive for other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme holds for symmetric and asymmetric cases.
If country A adopts the minimum price-rule, a switch to uniform pricing (because country B or C also adopt an external reference pricing scheme) increases the drug price in country A (p > p min
. If country A adopts the average price-rule, a switch to uniform pricing decreases the drug price in country A (p < p avg A ). Proposition 4 summarizes the incentive for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme: Proposition 4 If country A adopts an external reference pricing scheme, there is the incentive for the third country or country with the higher drug price to also adopt ex-ternal reference pricing. If all countries adopt an external reference pricing scheme, the manufacturer sets a uniform drug price for all three countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have modelled di¤erent external reference pricing schemes -a price cap based on the drug price in one or two countries and on the minimum or average drug price-in a three-country framework. It studies the choice of external reference pricing schemes in one country as well as its e¤ect on welfare in the other countries, the manufacturer's export decision, and the incentives for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme. Depending on market size in the country adopting external reference pricing and market size di¤erence of the other two countries, welfare is highest under the minimum price-rule or under the average price-rule. External reference pricing increases the drug price and decreases welfare in the other countries. This is, there is a negative impact of regulation in one country on welfare in the other countries.
Country A reduces the drug price and increase welfare at the expense of other countries.
If the market size in the country adopting an external reference pricing scheme is su¢ciently large, the manufacturer does not export to the other countries. This result is in line with the observation that external reference pricing might induce launch delays in or limited supply to other countries. In the case of the manufacturer not exporting to the other countries, external reference pricing has no e¤ect on the drug price in country A, but has an e¤ect on the welfare in the other countries, namely that the drug is not available there.
Under external reference pricing in country A, there is the incentive for the other countries also adopt an external reference pricing scheme. This is, there is regulatory convergence. Only if country A adopts the average price-rule, there is also price convergence, with the uniform drug price being lower than the drug price under the average price-rule in country A. If country A adopts the minimum price-rule, the switch of the other countries to external reference pricing decreases the drug price in the respective country, but increases the drug price in country A. This suggests that external reference pricing does not necessarily result in a downward price trend.
